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Does a guilty plea waive a double jeopardy claim? The .USDC sitting in .____ 
HC in this case held that it does not. CA 4 affirmed by order (Craven, Butzner, 
Russell). A number of other CAs have held that a guilty plea ~ waive a 
double jeopardy claim. 
Petitioner received a 6 months sentence in a North Carolina trial court for 
the misdemeanor of assault with a deadly weapon. North Carolina has a two-tier 
system for adjudicating certain criminal cases, under which a person charged 
2. 
with a misdemeanor may be tried first in an inferior court and, if dissatisfied 
with the result, may have a trial de novo in a court of general criminal 
jurisdiction but must risk a greater punishment if convicted. Such a system 
is permissible under the due process . and double jeopardy clauses. Colten v. 
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) (Powell, J . in .majority). Petitioner moved 
for a trial de n?vo. Up to tha~ point, no constitutional problems appeared. 
Double Jeopardy Issues 
However, prior to trial de novo petitioner was indicted anew for the same 
offense, this time for the felony of assault with a deadly weapon with intent -----to kill. Thus, when Petitioner carne to his trial de novo, he faced a much more 
serious offense. The US DC held this to be a violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. It read Colten, supra, to mean that the state could allow trial de novo 
(with the risk of greater punishment) only where the charge at the new trial was 
identical to the charge at the original trial. This holding is, I believe, correct. 
Guilty Plea Issues 
The case is made c~plex, however because Petitioner pleaded guilty at the 
trial ~ ~. The state argues in its petition that the guilty plea waived any 
double jeopardy problems. There is CA authority for this position. The USDC, 
affirmed by CA 4, held to the contrary, on the theory that double jeopardy 
. 
went to the jurisdiction of the de novo trial court, was a fundamental right, and 
was not waivable . 
Cases from this Court aren't helpful. A split in the CAs does appear, 
although all CAs may not have faced the issue. The question might be certworthy. 
Call for a response. 
Owens 
September 16, 1973 JBO 
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Blackledge (state warden) v. Perry 
JJ. Brennan, White and Rehnquist joined you in seeking a 
response in this case. The issue presented is whether a guilty 
plea waives a double jeopardy claim. 
Respondent appears via appointed counsel, Counsel notes 
wryly that respondent was released from the custody of state 
.. authorities pursuant to the order of USDC J, Larkins (E.D, 
No, Car,) "and his present whereabouts to counsel are unknown," 
,~------------------------------------Accordingly, with no knowledge of respondent's fi~ncial status, 
counsel moves the Court to dispense with printing requirements, 
On the merits, respondent "concedes that certain language 
in the recent case of Tollett v, Henderson {this Court, OT 1972) 
• • • • would support a contention that the plea of guilty does 
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foreclose the raising of a constitutional claim, and 
limits an attack to the question of whether the voluntary and 
intelligent character of the guilty plea has been prejudicial 
(sic) by advice of counsel not 0withinl the range of competence 
. demanded of attorneys in • criminal cases. 1 " However, resp 
J 
urges the court to heed the admonition of the dissent in Tollett 
that wa iver should be 1111 decided on a case by case basis. 
Resp e also argues that his double jeopardy claim is 
controlled by a USSC case decided subsequent to his trial yet 
fully retroactive. (The case that allegedly controls is Price 
v. Georgia, 398 u.s. 323). Thus, Resp argues that it would be 
fundamentally unfair to argue that he waived a right that he ----------- -------------------------------------
did not Ill know existed. 
The latter argument is mildly ingenious, but I don't think 
it will wash. Price v. Ga. establishes that if you are charged 
\} .q J;- w;:;;-:urde: 1 but convicted of murder 2, you have in essence 
·17~ ,;/ been found not guilty of murder 1, Therefore, if your conviction 
~~ for murder 2 is ultimately overturned, you cannot be retried for 
murder 1 but only for murder 2. As you will see b, glancing at 
the facts set out in the original memo in this case, 1111 resp 
I 
"-! 
does not have such a case. He has the traditional double jeopardy , _____________ -
case of being tried and convicted of Ia murder 2 and then reindicted 
a~ :~ ~e1 · Resp has no argument that any jury 
..__ 
has implicitly found him not guilty of a higher offens e in the 
~ -- =::::: :::::::: ===-- = = 
process of conviction for a lesser offense. All of- this means 
that Petr's case was controlled by longstanding double jeopardy 
principles (rather than by Price) and thus it cannot be said 
• 
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that holding resp to the full meaning of his guilty plea 
would amount to forcing him to waive a right he could not 
have known existed. 
Resp also throws .. in some speculation that his 
guilty plea might have been induced by a Santobello violation 
(i.e., by a failure on the part of the state II to come through 
on its side of a plea bargain). This looks to be made up; at 
least it can't be addressed on the 111111 present record of this 
case. 
The case looks like a grant. 
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Blackledge (state ward6.rtf v. PrJry ~~-A; 0~ ~ ~. 
As the attached memos indicate, the primary issur. in 
this case is whether a guilty plea waives a double jeopardy 
claim. CA4 held that it did not, w~ich may be error calling --
for summary reversal. 
One of the clerks in J. White's chambersp Hal Scott, also 
'' I! thinks the case raises a potentially certworthy double jeopardy 
issue. As I expect J. White to add this case to the discuss 
list~ I think we can rely on him to carry the ball on a.this 
one, particularly since he authored the most relevant recent 
.. 5 precedent, Colten v. Kentucky, 407 u.s. 104 (1972). This 
/
memo will therefore simply set out some skele~al background to 
assist you in evaluating J. White's presentation of the case 
at Conference. 
* ~~~ J,{JJ t1~ :z ~~ ~ ~~·Cit. 
jh;$ \~~adMJ 
IAJA.C JoA~pl -~ 
~ .$tliM~ 
\~t..,·J~- ttf. 
~b~ l\ow ~ 
fA.$Dl.. ~wi~ 
+o tJa.te pr«~ 
,,~~t.jt 
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As you will remember from glancing at the earlier memos, 
the case involves the North Carolina two-tier criminal trial 
system, very similar to the Kentucky system approved by the 
court in the Colten case, supra. At • the NC District Court 
(the lower tier), .._ Respondent was found guilty of assault 
with a deadly weapon. He sought trial de novo ("appealed") in 
the NC Superior Court (the upper tier). However, in the 
interim the state brought down a new indictiment charging him 
..... with the greater offense of assault with a deadly 
weapon with intent to kill. Respondent pleaded guilty at 
this point. Subsequently, he sought federal HC on due process 
(deterrence of the right to "appeal," etc) and double 
jeopardy grounds. The USDC (J. Larkin) granted HC on the 
ground that Resp 0 s double jeopardy rights had been violated. 
CA4 (Braxton 0 Butzner, Russell) aff'd in a memo decision. 
The USDC concluded that Resp had a valid double jeopardy 
claim • p despite Col ten v. Kentucky. In that court's words a 
Although it is clear that Colton (sic) allows the 
state to operate a two tier system of ctiminal justiceo with 
trial de nove upon appeal from the lower Court, the Court 
cannot say that a system is valid when the offense charged 
is not the same in both Courts. To allow the situation which 
has occurred in this- cas e to be a part of such a system would 
be a gross miscarriage of justice. An absolute right of appeal 
(
is but a hollow phrase if a trial de novo is not held on the 
same offense as it was held on in the lower Court. 
If the State were allowed to try a defendant on a 
misdemeanor in the lower Court, and then to try the same 
defendant for a felony in the higher Court when the lower 
Court convictioon is contested 9 the iesult in the lower Court 
would be meaningless, and the District Court trial would be 
little more than a "proving ground" for the State's case. If 
a conviction can be secured on one of the essential elements 
of a felony in the lower Court, it would appear all the more 
simple to secure the felony conviction in the Superior Court. 
The State has, in effect, a choice in these matters. It may 
try the defendant for a misdemeanor in the District Cmurt 0 or 
it may try a defendant for a felony in the Superior Court. But 
it may not try a defendant for both offenses arising out of the 
same incident, in two separate Courts. Once there has been an 
election to try one offense as opposed to the other 9 that 
election is binding. 
In other words, the USDC read Colten as setting the 
outside limits on what the states. can do with two-tier 
trial systems. The offense charged must be the same at 
both tiers, even though the punishment can • differ. Note that 
terms, its holding 
was really based on the Due • Process c 1a~se, which is what 
Colten is all about, Colten really deals with the question 
of whether trial de novo with the risk of enhanced punishment 
.... impermissible deters the right to "appeal •• in a North 
Carolina v. Pearce, due process senseo 
Hal Scott contends, and I think that J, White agrees, 
that what the state did in this case did ~ constitute 
double jeopardy and was permissible as a matter of due . 
W'-
process wit~the limits of Colten, Thus, he thi~that the 
state wins in this one on either of two grounds~ at there 
was~ substantive constitutional violation to begin with, 
and that if there was, it was waived by the guilty plea, 
I agree with the latter point; I'm less certain of the first. 
For some of the reasons listed by the USDC, I would want to 
give very careful thought to whether, within the login of 
Colten, the state could up the charge on the trial de novo. 
~ Hal says that once the defendant decides to have another 
crack at it, the slate is wiped entirely clean with regard to 
the first trial, That would expand Colten, in my mind, and 
I'm not sure that the expansion would be wise. It might tend 
to undermine what looks to be an efficacious system under 
present law, 
In any event, defer to what J. White has to say about 
this case with regard to whether there is any substantive 
constitutional violation at all. 
A concluding notea the USDC treated this as a double 
je~ardy case, wh~n in truth it may be a due process, 
__,~ "----------------------------deterrence of the right to "appeal" CJlse. Thus, it may be 
- - - ( As =t "'-;...,. f'C~t..., ') 
technically inaccurate to say~that the primary issue is 
whether a guilty plea waives a double jeopardy claim. However, 
that probably doesn't make much difference, as I take it that 
a guilty plea would waive either a double jeopardy claim or 
a due process, "chill of appeal rights" claim. 
This case is undoubtedly tiiK going to have to be vacated 
and remanded. The task of the conference will be to decide 
what instructions to give the lower courts on remand--simply 
to clarify the impact of a guilty plea or to in addition speak 
to what the USDC said about substantive constitutional issues. 
r •,' 
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I "passed" at the Conference on Friday, 
you hear from me further. 
.. ,. ;,};.i~)~~t'J:. :~·· '\: -": 11.' t.?~···-. "' 
-x·., • As I stated at the Conference, I had thought that this case was 
controlled by Tollett. I do n<t consider the defense of double jeopardy, 
even if it were-· applicable, to be jurisdictional. If, as I have thought, 
an uncoerced guilty plea with advice of counsel waives constitutional 
rights (~. _g. , jury trial) as well as procedural defects, I would have 
thought that such a plea would waive such right a~ the defendant had 
. not to be charged with a more serious offense. ~~ 1; """ ., • . ur. , 
·" WhHe. I still incline to this view, I will reconsider my position 
in light of .mtalscussion at the Conference and particularly in view of 
what may be written. But for the time being, I am inclined to adhere 
to my initial view. 
To: The Chief Tu~tice 
Mr. Ju~t~c~ I 1unlas 
Mr. Jur,t, l.c' B· ,_,nnan 
Mr. Just·c( \ .ti~o 
Mr. Jur;;;Lc'} ~· S'1"1ll 
/ 
Mr. Just c .J w· ... ,..m 
2nd DRAFT 
Mr. Justice OI.Ul ./ 
Mr . Justice R~hnruist 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITEffSTA¥Esr~,R J: r. 
Circul ated: A 1':3/4 
No. 72-1660 
Recirculat ed: 
Stanley Blackledge, Warden, 
et al. , Petitioners, 
v. 
Jimmy Seth Perry. 
[Apnl 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. 
l~74j 
MR. Jus•r1cE STEWAR"J' delivered th e opnuon of th t> 
Court. 
While servmg a term of impnsonment in a North 
Carolina penitentiary, the respondent Perry became 
involved in an altercation with another inmate. A 
warrant issued. charging Perry with the misdemeanor 
' of assault with a deadly weapon , N, C. Gen. S.tat. 
~ 14-33 (b)(l) (1969 ed.) . Under North Carolina law, 
the District Court Division of the General Court of 
.Justice has exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of mis-
demeanors. N. C. Gen. Stat. ~ 7 A- 272. Following a 
trial without a jury in the District Court of Northamp-
ton County, Perry was convicted of this misdemeanor 
and given a six-month sentence , to be served after com-
pletion of the prison term he was then serving. 
Perry then filed a notice of appeal to the Northampton 
County Superior Court. Under ~orth Carolina law, a 
person convicted in the District Court has a right to a 
trial de novo in the Superior Court. N. C. Gen . Stat. 
~~ 7A-290, 15- 177.1. The right to trial de novo is 
absolute, there being no need for the appellant to allege 
error in the original proceeding. When an appeal is taken , 














2 BLACKLEDGE v. PERRY 
the prior conviction is annulled, and the prosecution and 
the defense begin anew in the Superior Court.1 
After the filing of the notice of appeal, but prior to 
the respondent's appearance for trial de novo in the 
Superior Court, the prosecutor obtained an indictment 
from a grand jury, charging Perry with the felony of 
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflict~ 
ing serious bodily iujury, N. C. Gen. Stat. s 14-32. The 
indictment covered the same conduct for which Perry 
had been tried and convicted in the District Court. 
Perry entered a plea of guilty to the indictment in the 
Superior Court, and was sentenced to a term of five to 
seven years in the penitentiary, to be served concurrently 
with the prison sentence he was then serving. 2 
A number of months later, the respondent filed an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus in the Pnited 
States District Court for the Eastern District of North 
Carolina. He claimed that the indietment on the felony 
charge in the Superior Court constituted double jeopardy 
and also deprived him of due process of law. In an Ul1re-
ported opinion, the District Court dismissed the petition 
1 See genemlly State v Spencer, 276 N. C. 535, 173 S. E. 2cl 764; 
State v. Spw·1·ow, 276 N. l'. 499, 17:3 S. E. 2d S97 . 
2 The respondent '~ guilty plra wa~ apparently prr mt;;ed on the 
expectation that. an~· ~entpnce hP rrc(•ived in the ~uperior court 
would be ~erved concurrently with the ~Pntence hr wa.s then ~rrving , 
as contra~ted wtth the con~t'c:utivr ~entell('<' impo~erl in the Di~trict 
Court. That PXJlC'elation was fulfilled , but it turned out that the 
guilty plPa re~ulted in mcrea~ing the re::;pondrnt 's potential term of 
incarceration. Under applicable ::'\orth Carolina law, the five- to 
~even-yea r m;::;ault ::;rntencr did not commrnc<' until the date of the 
guilty plea, October 29, 19()9 . By that time, Perry had already 
::;erved some 17 month~ of the sentence he wa::; serving at the time 
of the alleged a::;~ault. Thu~, thr effect of the fivr- to seven-yrar 
concurrent ~entrnce on tl1<' as.~ault charge was to mcrca;o;e hi::; poten-
tial period of confinement by t hr::;e 17 months, as opposrd to the 
six-month i11erea:sr rnvi::;ag('d by the Di~trict Court's con:;ecutive 
~ontcnce. 
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for failure to exhaust available state remedies. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reversed, holding that resort to the state courts would 
be futile, because the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
had consistently rejected the constitutional claims preJ 
sented by Perry in his petition. 453 F. 2d 856.a The 
case was remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
On remand, the District Court granted the writ. It 
held that the bringing of the felony charge after the filing 
of the appeal violated Perry's rights under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made appli-
cable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784. The District Court 
further held that the respondent had not, by his guilty 
plea in the Superior Court, waived his right to raise his 
constitutional claims in the federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding. - F. Supp. -. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment in a brief per curiam. opinion. 
F. 2d --. We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 980, to conw 
sider the seemingly important issues presented by this 
case. 
3 The Court of AppPab further m~tructPd thP District Comt to 
await the ruling of thi~ Comt in Rice Y. North Carolina, 434 F . 2d 
297 (CA4), cPrt. grant<.>d , 401 U. S. 1008. Ru·e involved a chal-
lenge to the collstitutionalily of an enhauced penalty rec<.>ived after 
a criminal defendant had ::;ought a trial de novo under North Caro-
lina'::; two-tiered misdPmeanor adjudication system. This Court did 
not reach the merit~ of this issue in Rice, instead vacating and 
remanding to the Court of Appeals for consideration as to whcthPr 
the case h11,d become moot 404 U. S. 244. 
Subsequpntly, in Cotten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, we dealt with 
the merits of this i::;::;ue, and h<.>ld that thr Imposition of an increased 
::;entence on trial de 'IWVO did not violatr rither the Dur Process or 
the Double .Teopardy Clause. Tlw District Court in the present, 
ca~e had the benefit of the Cotten decision beforE> issuing its opinion 
granting habea<~ corpus reliff. 
72- 1660-0PINlO 
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I 
As in the District Court, Perry directs two independ-
ent constitutional attacks upon the conduct of the 
State in hailing him into court on the felony charge after 
he took an appeal from the misdemeanor conviction. 
First, he conte11ds that the felony indictment in the 
superior court placed him in double jeopardy, since he 
had already been convicted on the lesser included mis-
demeanor charge in the District Court. Second, he urges 
that the indictment on the felony charge constituted 
a penalty for his exercising his statutory right to appeal , 
and thus contravened the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. ' We find it necessary to reach 
only the latter claim . 
Perry's due process arguments are derived substan-
tially from A'orth Carolina \'. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 , and 
its progeny. In Pearce, the Court considered the consti-
tutional problems presented when, following a successful 
appeal and reconviction, a criminal defendant was sub-
jected to a greater punishment than that imposed at the 
first trial. While we concluded that such a harsher sen-
tence was uot absolutely precluded by either the Double 
Jeopardy or Due Process Clause, we emphasized that 
"imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having 
successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or col-
lateral remedy would be .. . a violation of due process 
4 Thi::; Court ha::; nevrr lwld that the State:; are cou:;titutionnlly 
required to e:;tabli~h avenue:,; of appellate revirw of criminal convtc-
tion:,;. Nonetheless, ''it i:,; now fundamrntal that , oncP Pstablishcd, 
these avmuc:; mu:;t be kt•pt frN' of unrra:;onrd di::;t inction::; that 
can only imprde opm and equal aece~:;:; to thP courts." Rinaldi v. 
Yeager, 3H4 U. S. ;305, :no. See abo G1imn v. Illinois, :351 U. S. 
12; Douglas v. ('alijornia. :372 U. S. ;~;35; Lane v. Brou•n, :372 U S. 
477 ; Draper v. Washington , :372 U. S. 487 ; North ('aroliua v. 
Pearce, :395 U S. 711 , 7:24-725 ; Chaffin v 8tyuchcombe, 412 U !3 . 
17, 24 11 11. 
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of law." !d., at 724. Because "vindictiveness against 
a defendant for having successfully attacked his first con-
viction must play no part in the sentence he receives 
after a new trial," id., at 725, we held that an increased 
sentence could not be imposed upon retrial unless the 
sentencing judge placed certain specified findings on the 
record . 
In Cotten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, the Court was 
called upon to decide the applicability of the Pearce 
holding to Kentucky's two-tiered system of criminal 
adjudication. Keutucky. like North Carolina, allows 
a misdemeanor defendant convicted in an inferior trial 
court to seek a retrial de novo in a court of general 
jurisdiction.5 The appellant in Colten claimed that the 
Constitution prevented the court of general jurisdiction 
after trial de novo, from imposing a sentence in excess of 
that imposed in the court of original trial. This Court 
rejected the Pearte analogy. Emphasizing that Pearce 
was directed at insuring the absence of "vindictiveness" 
against a criminal defendant who attacked his initial 
conviction on appeal. the Court found such dangers 
greatly minimized on the facts presentcrt in Cotten. In 
contrast to Pearce, the court that imposed the increased 
sentence after retrial in Colten was not the one whose 
original judgment had prompted an appellate reversal ; 
thus, there was little possibility that an increasPd sen-
tence on trial de novo could have been motivated by per-
sonal vindictiveness on the part of thE' sentencing judge. 
Hence, the Court thought the prophylactic rule of 
Pearce unnecessary in the de novo trial and sentencing 
context of Colten 
The Pearce decision was again interpreted by this 
Court last Term in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. fl . 17, 
li For ft mor<• E-xhaustive list of StatE'::; employing ::;nmlur two-tlcred 
procedures, SE'e ('olten, supra, a1 112 n 4. 
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in the setting of Georgia's system under which sentencing 
responsibility is entrusted to the jury. Upon retrial 
following the reversal of his original conviction, the 
defendant in Chaffin was reconvicted and sentenced to 
a greater term than had been imposed by the initial 
jury. Concentrating again on the issue of vindictive-
ness. the Court found no violation of the Pearce rule. 
It was noted that the second jury was completely 
uuaware of the original senteuce, and thus could hardly 
have sought to "puuish" Chaffin for his successful appeal. 
Moreover, the jury, unlike a judge who had beeu reversed 
on appeal. could hardly have a stake in the prior convic-
tion or any motivation to discourage criminal clefendauts 
from seeking appellate review. Heuce, it was concluded 
that the danger of vindictiveness under the circumstances 
of the case was "de minimis," ·id., at 26, and did not 
require adoption of tlw constitutional rule set out in 
Pearce. 
The lesson that emerges from Pearce, Colten, and 
Cha!fi11 is that the Due Process Clause is not offended 
by all possibilities of increased punishment upon ret~ial 
after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likeli-
hood of "vindicti venrss. " Unlike the circumstances pre-
sented by those cases, however, in the situation herr the 
central figure is not the judge or the jury, but the prose-
cutor. The question is whether the opportunities for 
vindictiveness in this situatiou are such as to impel the 
conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analo-
gous to that of the Pearce case. We conclude that the 
answer must be in thr affirmative . 
A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in dis-
couraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing and 
thus obtaining a trial de novo in the superior court, since 
such an appeal will clearly require increased expenditures 
of. prosecutorial resources before the defendant's convic-
tion becomes final , and may even result in a formerly 
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convicted defendant going free. And, if the prosecutor 
has the means readily at hand to discourage such 
appeals-by "upping the ante'' through a felony indict-
ment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pursues his 
statutory appellate remedy, the State can ins'ure that 
only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards 
of a de 11ovo trial. 
There is, of course, 110 evidence that the prosecutor 
in this case acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking 
:a felony indictmt>nt against Perry . Th0 rationale of our 
,judgment in the Pearce case. however, was not p:roundcd 
upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motivatwn 
must inevitably exist. Rather. we emphasized that "sinc<> 
thE' fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally 
deter a defpndaJlt 's exercise of the right to appeal his 
first conviction, due process also requires that a defend · 
ant be freed of apprchPnsion of such a retaliatory moti-
vation on the part of the srntencing judge.'' 395 F. S .. 
at 725. We think it clear that the same considrrations 
apply here. A person convicted of an offense is entitled 
to pursue his statutory right to a trial d(: novr>, without 
apprehension that the State will rrtaliatr by ~ubstituting 
a more serious charge' for the original one, thus subject-
ing him to a significantly increased potential period of 
incarceration.'; Cf f'nited States v .Tnckson, 390 r S 
570. 
Due process of law requires that such a potential for 
vindictiveness must not enter into North Carolina's two-
0 1\Ioreovcr, rvrn puttm~J: to on<· ~ld<' tiH' potputwl!ty of nH·rc·a~l·d 
incarcemtiou, eonviction of a ''frlon~-" oftc•n eutaib more ::;rrJou" 
collateral COJ1.~rquenc·e::; than t ho;;e incurred through a rni~drmcanor 
conviction. See genrrally Projc•rt , Thr CollatPml Cons<'quc·ncr~ of 
a Criminal Conviction, :2;{ \'ami. L B<'v 929, 0.55-9()0; Note>, Civ1l 
Disabilitie::; of Frlon;;, 5:3 \'~- L J1Pv . -tm, 40G--+O~ Cf. O'Brien 1 
Skinner,- tr . 8.- (mvolving Nrw York Jaw, undrr which rcm -
victcd misd<•mranant" rrtnin th<· right to vote). 
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tiered appellate process. We hold, therefore, that it was 
not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond 
to Perry's invocation of his statutory right to appeal by 
bringing a more serious charge against him at the trial 
de novo/ 
II 
The remaining question is whether, because of his 
guilty plea to the felony charge in the Superior Court, 
Perry is precluded from raising his constitutional claims 
in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. In contending 
that such is the case, the p0titioner warden relies chiefly 
on this Court's decision last Trrrn ill Tollett v. H ender-
son, 4.11 U. S. 258 
The precise issue presented in Tollett was "whether a 
state prisoner, pleading; guilty with the advice of counsel , 
may later obtain release through federal habeas corpus 
by proving only that the inclictmen t to which he pleaded 
was returned by an unconstitutionally selected grand 
jury." ld., at 260. The Cour'"t answered that question 
in the negative. Relying primarily on the guilty piea 
trilogy of Brady v. United States , 397 U. S. 742; 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, and Parker v. 
North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, the Court characterized 
the guilty plea as "a break in the chain of events which 
has preceded it iu the criminal process." ld., at 267. 
Accordingly, the Court held that when a criminal defend-
1 This would clearly br a dif-l'rrent ca::;c 1f thr Statr had ~hown 
that it was impo::;~ibln to JlrocE'ed ou thr morr ::;cnou::; charge at 
the outset, as in Diaz v. Unitl'd .States, 22:3 U.S. 442. lu that ra~r 
the defendant wa~ origin:tll)· tried and convicted for a::>::<Hult and 
battrry. Sub::;equent to the original trial, the :.t~r;;ndt victim dird . 
and the ddcndant wm; thPn trird aud convicted for homicidr. 
Obviom;ly, it would not have been po::;siblr for the authoritirs in 
Diaz to havr onginally proceed rei against t hr defendant on t hr more 
srrious charge, ::>iJJCe the crime of bomicidP was not complete unt1l 
after the victim'::; dettth . 
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ant enters a guilty plea, "he may not thereafter raiEe 
independent claims relating to the deprivation of con-
stitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the 
guilty plea." Ibid. Rather, a perwn complaining of 
such "antecedent constitutional violations,;; id., at 266, 
is limited in a federal habeas corpus proceeding to attacks 
on the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty plea, 
through proof that the advice received from counsel was 
not "within the range of competence demanded of attor-
neys in criminal cases." See Mc1vfann, supra, at 771. 
Much of the language in Tollett is sweeping, and might 
conceivably be read to support the arguments advanced 
by the petitioner in this case. We think, however, that 
there is a fundamental distinction between this case and 
Tollett . While the underlying claims presented in Tol-
lett and the Brady trilogy were of constitutional dimen-
sion, none went to the very power of the State to bring 
the defendant into court to answer the charge brought 
against him. The defendants in McMa11n v. Richard-
son, for example, could surely have been brought to trial 
without the use of the allegedly coerced confessions, and 
even a tainted indictment of the sort alleged in Tollett 
could have been "cured" through a new indictment by 
a properly selected grand jury. In the case at hallCI, 
by contrast, the nature of the underlying constitutional 
infirmity is markedly different. Having chosen origi-
nally to proceed on the misdemeanor charges in the Dis-
trict Court, the State of North Carolina was, under the 
facts of this case, simply precluded by the Due Process 
Clause from calling upon the respondent to answer to 
the more serious charge in the Superior Court. Unlike 
the defendant in Tollett , Perry is not complaiuing of 
"antecedent constitutional violations" or of a "depriva-
tion of constitutiontal rights that occurred prior to the 
entry of the guilty plea." Rather, the right that he 
asserts and that we today accept is the right not to be 
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hailed into court at all upon the felony charge. The 
very initiation of the proceedings against him in the 
superior court thus operated to deny him due process of 
law. 
Last Term in Robin.son. v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505, in 
explaining why the Double Jeopardy Clause is distinctive, 
the Court noted that "its practical result is to prevent a 
trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe the 
procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial." I d. , 
at 509. While our judgment today is not based upon the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, we think that the quoted lan-
guage aptly describes the due process right upon which 
our judgment is based. The "practical result" dictated 
by the Due Process Clause in this case is that North 
Carolina simply could not permissibly require Perry to 
answer to the felony charge. That being so, it follows 
that his guilty plea did not foreclose him from attacking 
his conviction in the Superior Court proceedings through 
a federal writ of habeas corpus. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit is affirmed. 
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MR. JusTICE S'l'EWART delivered the up1mou of the 
Court. 
While servll1g a term of impnsonment 111 a North 
Carolina penitentiary , the respondent Perry became 
mvolved in an altercation with another inmate. A 
warrant issued, charging Perry with the misdemeanor 
of assault with a deadly weapon, ~ . C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-33 (b) (1) (1969 ed.). rndt>r North Carolina law, 
tlw District Court Divisio11 of tlw ( ;eneral Court of 
,Justice has exclusive JUrisdiction for tlH' trial of mis· 
df'meanors. N C Gen. ~tat ~ 7 \ 272. Following a 
trial without a .1 ury in thE' D1strict Court of .:-\ orthamp-
toll County PPrry was convicted of this misdemeanor 
and given a six-month sentence, to be !"erved after com-
pletion of the prison term he was then serving. 
Perry then filed a notice of appeal to the Northampton 
County Superior Court. ender ~orth Carolina law, a 
person convicted in thP Distriet Court has a right to a 
trial de novo in the Supenor C'omt. :'1:. C. Ucn. Htat. 
§~ 7A-290, 15- 177.1 Thp right to trial de novo 1s 
absolutE', there being no need for the a.ppPllant to allege 
error in th<> original ])J'OCef'ding. Wlwn an appeal is taken, 
the statutory schf'me provides that the slate is wiped clean ) 
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the prior conviCtwn IS annulled, and the prosecution and 
the defense begin anew in the Superior Court.1 
After the ·filing of the notice of appeal, but prior to 
the respondent's appearance for trial de novo in the 
Superior Court, the prosecutor obtained an indictment 
from a grand jury, charging Perry with the felony of 
assault with a deadly weapon with in tent to kill inflict~ 
iug serious bodily injury, N. C. Gen. Stat. ~ 14- 32. The 
indictment covered the same conduct for which Perry 
had been tried and convicted in the District Court. 
Perry entered a plea of guilty to the indictment in thf' 
:Superior Court, and was sentenced to a term of five to 
seven years in the penitentiary , to be served concurrently 
with the prison sentence he was thc11 serving." 
A number of l.JlOnths later, the respondent filed an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of North 
Carolina. He claimed that the indictment on the felony 
charge in the Superior Court constituted double jeopardy 
and also deprived him of due process of law. In an unre-
ported opinion, the District Court dismissed the petition 
' See generally State v Spencer, 276 N . C. 5:35, 173 ~ . E. 2d 764 ; 
0tute v. Spw-row, :276 N. C. 49!J, 17a 8 h. :.!d R97 
2 The re:;vondent 's guilty plea wa:; a pparent ly prrmu.;ed ou 1 he 
expectation that. any ~entPnce hP rerri ved in the superior court 
would be served concurrently with thr :;<•ntenep h<· wa,; thPn sPrvmg, 
a;; contra~:;t rd with 1 he con~ecutiw sentPncr impo;;ed in the Di;; trict 
C ourt That PXp E'ctation was fulftlled , but It turned out t hat the 
guilty plea rp:;ulted in incrpa~ing th E' rPspondent 's pot Pntial tr rm of 
mea rcPralion. Undr r appli cablr North Carolina law, t he fi ve- to 
;;even-yea r assault :sentencr did not rommmcr until t he date of th E' 
guilty plPa, October :29. HHi!:J. By tha t tune, ]'('tTy had alrea dy 
~rrvrd 1:\0me 17 months of thr 8Pntrmr lw wa" ~rrv!Ilg at tlw time 
of the a ll r!l:rd a~~ault . Thu~. tlw pffrct of t hr fivp- to ~rven-year 
roncurrt'nt ::,ent ence on t lw a~:>sault charg<' wa.-. to Jllcrrao;t' In,; potP!l-
tial pr n od of coJJfint'ment. by tlw,;r 17 mont h:;, as oppo~rd to t. hc 
.six-m onth increa ~r r nvisaged b~· t hr D1~t ri r t. Comt 's consecutive 
:sent rnr.e 
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for failure to exhaust available state remedies. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reversed, holding that resort to the state courts would 
be futile, because the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
had consistently rejected the constitutional claims pre-
sented by Perry in his petition. 453 F. 2d 856.3 The 
case was remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
On remand, the District Court granted the writ. It 
held that the bringing of the felony charge after the filing 
of the appeal violated Perry's rights under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made appli-
cable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784. The District Court 
furthrr held that the respondent had not, by his guilty 
plea in the Superior Court, waived his right to raise his 
constitutional claims in the federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding. - F. Supp. -. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment in a brief per curiam opinion. -
F . 2d -. We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 980, to con-
sider the seemingly important issues presented by this 
case. 
:l The Court of AppPab fur11wr mstructed the D1~trict Court to 
nwa1i. the ruhng of this Court m Rice v. North Carolina, 434 F. 2d 
297 (CA4), cert. granted, 401 U S. 100!-l. Rice mvolwd a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of au enhanced penalty received after 
a criminal defendant had :;ought a trial de 1wvo under North Caro-
lina's two-tiered misdemeanor adjudication system. This Court did 
not rrach the merits of this IS!!ur in Rice, instead vacating and 
remanding to the Court or AppC'nl;< for consideration a~ to whether 
thr case had become moot 404 P S. 244. 
Subsequently, in Co/ten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, we dealt with 
the mC'nts of this issue , and held that the ImpositiOn of an increased 
selltt'l1('C on trial de novo did not violatE' rither the Due Process or 
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Du;tnct Court in the present 
ra~e had the benefit of the Colten drci:oion before issuing its opinion 
grantmg hn.hr.as corpus rehef. 
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I 
As in the District Court, Perry directs two independ-
ent constitutional attacks upon the conduct of the 
State in hailing him into court on the felony charge after 
he took an appeal from the misdemeanor conviction. 
First, he contends that the felony indictment in the 
superior court placed him in double jeopardy, since he 
had already been convicted on the lesser included mis-
demeanor charge in the District Court. Second, he urges 
that the indictment on the felony charge constituted 
a penalty for his exercising his statutory right to appeal, 
and thus contravened the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.' We find it necessary to reach 
only the latter claim. 
Perry's due process arguments are derived substan-
tially from North. Carolina v. Pearce, 395 ·e. ~. 711, and 
1ts progeny. In Pearce, the Court considered the consti-
tutional problems presented when, following a successful 
appeal and reconviction, a criminal defendant was sub-
jected to a greater punishment than that imposed at the 
first trial. While we concluded that such a harsher sen-
tence was not absolutely precluded by either the Double 
Jeopardy or Due Process Clause, we emphasized that 
"imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having 
successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or col-
lateral remedy would be . . a violation of due process 
·~ Th1s Court has never held that the StateH are constitutionally 
required to establish avenues of appellate review of criminal convic-
tions. Nonetheless , "it is now fundamental that, once established, 
these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that 
can only impede open Hnd equal acce.ss to the court::; ." Rinaldi v. 
Yeager, 884 U. S. 305, 310. See alr:;o Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S, 
12 ; Douglas v. California , 372 U. S. 335 ; Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 
477 ; Draper v. Wa.shington, ;~72 F . S. 487 : Nor·th CaroLina v, 
Pearce , 395 U. S. 711, 724-725 : Chaffin v Stunchcombe, 412 U. S. 
17, 24 ! L 11. 
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o£ law." I d., at 724. Because "vindictiveness against 
a defendant for having successfully attacked his first con-
viction must play no part in the sentence he receives 
after a new trial," id., at 725, we held that an increased 
sentence could not be imposed upon retrial unless the 
sentencing judge placed certain specified findings on the 
record. 
In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104; the Court was 
called upon to decide the applicability of the Pearce 
holding to Kentucky's two-tiered system of criminal 
adjudication. Kentucky, like North Carolina, allows 
a misdemeanor defendant convicted in an inferior trial 
court to seek a retrial de novo in a court of general 
jurisdiction.5 The appellant in Colten claimed that the 
Constitution prevented thE' court of general jurisdiction, 
after trial de novo, from imposing a srntence in excess of 
that imposed in the court of original trial. This C'ourt 
rejected the Pearce analogy Emphasizing that Pem·ce 
was directed at insurillg the absence of "vindictiveness" 
against a criminal defendant who attacked his initial 
conviction on appeal, thE' Court found such dangers 
greatly minimized on the facts presented in Colten. In 
contrast to Pearce, the court that imposed the increased 
sentence after retrial in Colten was 11ot the one whose 
original judgment had promptE'd all appellate reversal; 
thus, there was little possibility thai an increased sen-
tence on trial de novo could havE' been motivated by per~ 
soual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge. 
Hence, the Court thought the prophylactic rule of 
Pearce unnecessary in the de novo trial and sentencing 
context of Colten 
The Pearce decision was agam mterpreted by this 
Court last Term in Chaffin,, 8tynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 
5 For u, more exbaustlvo hst of Staib' t·mplonug ~urular two-tiered 
procPdum<:; , Hl'e Colten, su.pm, ·tt 11 2 n. 4, 
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ii1 the setting of Georgia's system under which sentencing 
responsibility is entrusted to the Jury. Upon retrial 
following the reversal of his original conviction, the 
defendant in Chaffin was reconvicted and sentenced to 
a greater term than had been imposed by the initial 
jury. Concentrating again on the issue of vindictive~ 
ness, the Court found no violatwn of the Pearce rule. 
It was noted that the seco11d Jury was completely 
unaware of the original sentence, and thus could hardly 
have sought to "1mnish" Chaffin for his successful appeal. 
Mon•over, the jury, unlikr a .Judg<' " ·ho had been reversed 
on appeal, could hardly have a stake in the prior convic~ 
tion or any motivation to discourage criminal defendants 
from seeking appellate review Hence. rt was concluded 
that the danger of vmdictivencss under th<' circurnstanceg 
of the case was ''de mini111is," 1d., at 2fi. a11d did not. 
reqmre adoption of the coJJStitutwual rulP 8et out m 
Pearce. 
The lesson that emrrges from Pearce, Colten, and 
Chaffin is that the Dur Process ClauRe IS not offended 
by all possibilities of increased pumshmeut upon retrial 
after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likeli-
hood of "vindictiveness.'' lT nlike the circumstances pre-
sented by those cases, however. in the situation here thr 
central figure is uot the judge or thr Jury, but the prose-
cutor The question is whether the opportunities for 
vindictiveness in this situation are guch as to impel the 
conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analo-
gous to that of the Pearce case. We conclude that the 
answer must be in the affirmative 
A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake m dis-
couraging convicted misderneanants from appealing and 
thus obtaining a trial de novo in the' superior court, since 
such an appeal will clearly n'quire increased ex penditures 
of prosecutorial resources hdorr the dE·fe11dant's convic-
tion becomes final, and may 8VPJJ result .in a formerly 
72-i66o:-OPINION 
BLACKLEDGE 11 PEHRY 
convicted defendant going free. And, if the prosecutor 
has the means readily at hand to discourage such 
appeal&-by "upping the ante" through a felony indict-
ment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pursues his 
statutory appellate remedy, the State can insure that 
only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards 
of a de novo trial. 
There is, of course, no evidence that the prosecutor 
in this case acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking 
a felony indictment against P0rry. The rationale of our 
judgment i11 the Pearce cat:e, howeV0r, was not grounded 
Upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motivatioll 
must inevitably exist. Rather, we emphasi11ed that "since 
the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutiona11y 
deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal his 
first conviction, due process also requires that a defend-
ant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory moti-
vation on the part of the Sf'ntencing .i udge." 395 r. 14., 
at 725. We think it clear that the same considerations 
apply here. A person convicted of an offcnsC' is cntitl0d 
to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without 
apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting 
a more serious charge for the original one, thus subject-
ing him to a significantly increased potential period of 
incarceration.'; C'f. [7 nited SLates v. Jackson, 300 U. S. 
570. 
Due process of law requires that such a potential for 
vindictiveness must not enter into i'\orth Carolina's two-
6 MorcovC'r, evrn puttmg to onP ~iciP tlw putrnlmlJty of increa:-;ed 
incarceration, conviction of a ''fdony" oftrn rntaih; more srrious 
collateral consequences thc111 those incurred through a misdemeanor 
conviction. See generally Pro jeri, The Colla lrral Consequencr~ of 
a Criminal CmlYictio11, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929, 055-960 ; Note, Civtl 
Disabilitie;; of Felon~, 5a Va. L. HC'v ... !Q:~. 40()-40R. Cf. O'Brien \ , 
Skinner,- U. S.- (mvolving New York law, under which con-
victed misdemeananl8 Trtain thr right tu \' 01.PI . 
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tiered appellate process. We hold, therefore, that it was 
not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond 
to Perry's invocation of his statutory right to appeal by 
bringing a more serious charge against him at the trial 
de novo/ 
.II 
The remaining question is whether, because of hi~ 
guilty plea to the felony charge in the Superior Court! 
Perry is precluded from raising his constitutional claims 
in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. In contendihg 
that such is the case, the petitioner warden relies chiefly 
on this Court's decision last Term in Tollett v. Hender· 
son, 411 U. S. 258. 
The precise issue presented in Tollett was "whether a 
state prisoner, pleading guilty with the advice of counsel, 
may later obtain release through federal habeas corpus 
by proving only that the indictment to which he pleaded 
was returned by an unconstitutionally selected grand 
jury.'' /d., at 260. The Court answered that question 
in the negative. Relying primarily on the guilty plea 
trilogy of Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742; 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, and Parker v. 
North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, the Court characterized 
the guilty plea as "a break in the chain of events which 
has preceded it in the criminal process.'' !d., at 267. 
7 This would clearly be a differPnt case if thP State had shown 
that it was impossible to proceed on the more serious charge at 
the outset, as .m Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442 . In that case 
the defendant was originally trif'd and convicted for assault and 
battery. Subsequent to the original trial, thf' a;;sault victim died. 
and the defendant was thrn tried and convicted for homicide. 
Obviously, it would not have bf'en poRHiblf' for the authorities in 
Diaz to have originally procreded against the defendant on the more 
serious charge, since the crime of homicide was not complete until 
after the victim's death. 
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Accordingly, the Court held that when a criminal defend-
ant enters a guilty plea, "he may not thereafter raise 
independent claims relating to the deprivation of con-
stitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the 
guilty plea." Ibid. Rather, a person complaining of 
such "antecedent constitutional violations," id., at 266, 
is limited in a federal habeas corpus proceeding to attacks 
on the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty pleal 
through proof that the advice received from counsel was 
not "within the range of competence demanded of attor-
neys in criminal cases." See Mc1liann, supra, at 771 . 
I 
While the petitioner's reliauce upon the Tollett opinion 
is understandable, there is a fundamental distinction be-
tween this case and that one, Although the underlying 
claims presented in Tollett and the Brady trilogy were of 
constitutional dimension, none went to the very power of 
the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the 
charge brought against him. The defendants in M eM ann 
v. Richardson, for example, could surely have been brought 
to trial without the use of the allegedly coerced confessions, 
and even a tainted indictment of the sort alleged in TolleU 
could have been "cured" through a new indictment by 
a properly selected grand jury. In the case at hand, 
by contrast, the nature of the underlying constitutional 
infirmity is markedly different. Having chosen origi-
nally to proceed on the misdemeanor charges in the Dis-
trict Court, the State of North Carolina was, under the 
facts of this case, simply precluded by the Due Process 
Clause from calling upon the respondent to answer to 
the more serious charge in the Superior Court. Unlike 
the defendant in Tollett, Perry is not complaining of 
"antecedent constitutional violations" or of a "depriva-
tion of constitutiontal rights that occurred prior to the 
entry of the guilty plea." Rather, the right that he 
asserts and that we today accept is the right not to be 
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hailed into court at all upon the felony charge. The 
very initiation of the proceedings against him in the 
superior court thus operated to deny him due process of 
law. 
Last Term in Robinson v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505, in 
explaining why the Double Jeopardy Clause is distinctive, 
the Court noted that "its practical result is to prevent a 
trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe the 
procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial." I d., 
at 509. While our judgment today is not based upon the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, we think that the quoted lan-
guage aptly describes the due process right upon which 
our judgment is based. The "practical result' ' dictated 
by the Due Process Clause in this case is that North 
Carolina simply could not permissibly require Perry to 
answer to the felony charge. That being so, it follows 
that his guilty plea did not foreclose him from attacking 
his conviction in the Superior Court proceedings through 
a federal writ of habeas corpus. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit is affirmed. 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
I would find it more difficult than the Court appar-
ently does in Part I in its opiniot1. to conclude that the 
very bringing of more serious charges against respondf'nt 
following his request for a trial de novo violated due 
process as defined i11 N o1·th Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. H. 
711 (1969). Still more importantly, I believe the Court's 
conclusion that respondent may assert the Court's new-
found Pearce claim i11 this fedPral habeas action. despit<' 
his plea of guilty to the charges brought after his iuvoea,-
tion of his statutory right to a trial de novo, tnarks an 
unwarranted departure from the prine1plc•s WP have 
recently enunciated in Tollett v Henderson, 411 l. S. 158 
(1973), and the Brady trilogy, Brady \. Uuited States, 
397 U.S. 742 ( 1970). AfcMann v Richardson, 3P7 U. H. 
759 ( 1970), and Parker v . . Vorth Carolina, 397 U. S. 7HO 
( 1970). 
I 
As the Court notes, in additioJJ tio his claim bar-;ed Oil 
Pearce respondent contends that his fC'louy indictnwnt 
in the superior court violatPd his rights uud<~r tlw 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. madE' 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
men t , Benton v. Maryland, 395 F. S. 784 (1969). Pre .. 
sumably because we have earlier held that "the jeopardy 
c'v.l!'lted: _.bl') __ 
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incident to" a trial does "no ~xtend to an offense beyond 
l the trial court'sj jurisdiction,'' Diaz v. [/ nited States, 
223 U. S. 442, 449 (1912), the Court rests its decision 
instead on the Fourteenth Amendment due process doc-
trine of Pearce. In so doing, I think the Court too 
rPadily equates the role of the prosecutor. who is a natural 
adversary of the defendant and who we observed in 
Chaffin v. Stynchcmnbe, 412 U. ~. 17,27 (1973), "often 
requestfs21 more than [.he~ can reasonably expect to get,'' 
with that of the sentencing judge in Pearce. l also think 
the Court passes too lightly over the reasoning of Colten 
v. Keutucky, 407 U. S. 104 ( 1972), in which we held 
that imposition of the prophylatic rule of Pearce was not 
necessary in K<>ntucky's two-tier system for dP novo ap-
peals from justice court convictions, evru though the 
judge at retrial might impose a more sever<' sclltPnC<' 
than had been imposed by the justice court after the orig-
inal trial. 
The dissenting opinion in Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 726, 
took the position that the imposition of a penalty after 
retrial which exceeded the penalty imposed after the 
first trial violated the guarantee against double jeopardy. 
But the opinion of the Court. relying on cases such as 
United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662 (1896), and Stroud 
v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (HH9). HpecificaJly r('jected 
such an approach to the case. The Court went on to 
hold "tha.t neither the double jeopardy provision nor 
the equal protection clause imposes an absolute bar to a 
more severe sentence upon reconviction." 395 U. S., at 
723. The Court concluded by holding that due process 
"requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for 
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play 
no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial; 
And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconsti-
tutionally deter· a defendant's exel'cise of the right to 
appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due 
,, . 
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process also requires that a defendant be freed of appre-· 
hension of such a retaliatory motivation on the par~ of 
the sentencing judge." 395 U. S., at 725. To make 
certain that those requirements of due proces were met, 
the Court laid down the rule that "whenever a judge 
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after 
a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirma-
tively appear." 895 U. S .. at 726. Thus the avowed 
purpose of the remedy fashioned in Pearce was to pre-
vent judicial vindictiveness from resulting in longer 
sentencPs after a rPtrial following successful appeal. 
Since in theory if not in practice the second sentence 
in the Pearce situation might be expected to be the same 
as the first unless influenced by vindictiveness or by 
intervening conduct of the defendant, in theory at least 
the remedy mandated there reached no further than the 
identified wrong. The same cannot be said here. For 
while indictment on more serious charges after a success-
ful appeal would preseut a problem closely analogous to 
that in Pearce in this respect. the bringing of more 
serious charges after a defendant's exercise of his abso-
lute right to a trial de novo in North Carolina's two-tier 
system does not. The prosecutor here elected to proceed 
initially in the state district court where felony charges 
could not be prosecuted, for reasons which may well have 
been unrelated to whether he believed respondent was 
guilty of a.nd could be coD victcd of the felony with which 
he was later charged. Both prosecutor and defendant 
stand to benefit from an initial prosecutiou in the District 
Court, the prosecutor at least from its less burdensome 
procedures and the defendant from the opportuuity for 
an initial acquittal and the limited peualties. With the 
countervailing reasons for proceeding only on the mis-
demeanor charge in th(' District Court no longer appli-
cable oncf' the rlefend~wt has invoked his statutory right 
to a. trial de novo, a prose<1utor nef'd tWt"· lw vindietive 
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to seek to indict and convict a defendant of the more 
serious of the two crimes of which he believes the defend-
ant guilty. Thus even if one accepts the Court's 
equation of prosecutorial vindictiveness with judicial 
vindictiveness, here, uulike Pearce, the Court's remedy 
reaches far beyond the wrong it identifies. 
Indeed, it is not a little puzzling that the Court's 
remedy is the same that would follow upon a conclusion 
that the bringing of the new charges violated respond-
ent's rights under the Doublf• Jeopardy Clause. And the 
Court's co11clusion that "the very initiation of the pro-
ceedings against [respondent] in thr ~uperior Court 
operated to rleny h~ue process of law" surely sounds 
in the language of double jeopardy, however, it may be 
dressed in clue process garb. 
H 
If the Court is correct in stabng the consequences 
of upholding respondent's constitutional claim here, 
and indeed the State lacked "the very power to bring 
him to trial," I believe this case is governed by cases 
culminating in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 
( 1973). In that case the state no doubt lacked "power" 
to bring Henderson to trial without a valid grand jury 
indictment; yet that constitutional disability was held 
by us to be merged in the guilty plea. I do uot see why 
a constitutional claim the consequences of which make 
it the identical twin of double jeopardy rnay not, like 
double jeopardy, be waived by the per·son for whose 
benefit it is accorded. Kepner v. United States, 195 
U.S. 100, 131 (1904); Harris v. United States, 237 F. 2d 
274, 277 (CAS 1956); Kistner v. Un£ted States, 332 F. 
2d 978, 980 (CA8 1964), 
In Tollett v. Henderson, supra, we hold that "just 
as the guilty pleas in the Brady trilogy were found to 
foreclose direct inquiry into the merits of claimed ante-
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cedent constitutional violations there, ./.. respondent's 
guilty plea here alike forecloses independent inquiry into 
the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand 
jury." 411 U. S., at 266. Surely the due process viola-
tion found by the Court today is no less "antecedent" 
than the constitutional violations claimed to make the 
grand jury indictment invalid in Tollett v. Henderson, 
the confession inadmissible in M eM ann, or the exercise 
of the right to a jury trial impermissibly burdened in 
Brady and Parker. As the Court notes, we reaffirmed in 
Tollett v. Henderson the principle of the Brady trilogy 
that "a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of 
events which has preceded it in the criminal process." 
411 U. S., at 267. We went on to say there: 
"When a criminal dcfendan t has solemnly admitted 
in open court that he is iu fact guilty of the offense 
with which he is charged. he may not thereafter 
raise independent claims relating to the deprivation 
of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the 
entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the 
voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea 
by showing that the advice he received from counsel 
was not within the standards set forth in McMa'nn .'' 
Ibid. 
The assertion by the Court that this reasoning is some-
how inapplicable here because the claim goes "to the 
very power of the State to bring the defendant into court 
to answer the charge brought against him" is little other 
than a conclusion. Any difference between tho issue 
resolved the other way in 'Pollett v. Henderson nnd the 
issue before us today is at most sematic. But the Court's 
"test" not only fails to distinguish Hen,derson ; it nlso 
fails to provide any reasoned basis on which to approach 
such questions as whether a speedy trial claim is merged 
in a guilty plea. l believe the Court's departure today 
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from the principles of Henderson and the cases preceding 
it must be recognized as a potentially major breach in 
the wall of certainty surrounding guilty pleas for which 
we have found constitutional sanction in those cases. 
There is no indication in this record that respondent's 
guilty plea was the result of an agreement with the prose-
cutor. But the Court's basis for distinguishing the 
Henderson and Brady cases seeins so insubstantial as to 
permit the doctrine of this case to apply to guilty pleas 
which ha~~een obtained as a result of "plea bargains." 
In that event it will be not merely the State which stands 
to lose, but the accused defendant in thP position of the 
respondent as well. For the State has little incentive to 
agree to reduce a charge against an accuf:ed dcfeudaut m 
exchange for a guilty plea, if the defeudant may repudiate 
his part of the bargain at will upon his assertion that 
there was a constitutional infirmity at an earlier stage 
of the proceedings. 
III 
But if, as I believe, a proper analysis of respondent's 
constitutional claim produces at most a violation of the 
standards laid down in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, 
I agree with the Court, though not for the reasons it gives, 
that respondent's claim was not merged in his guilty 
plea. Imposition of sentence in violation of Pearce is 
not an "antecedent constitutional violation," since sen-
tence is customarily imposed after a plea of guilty, and 
is a separate legal event from the determination by the 
Court that the defendant is in fact guilty of the offense 
with which he is charged. 
If respondent's claim is properly analyzed in terms of 
Pearce, I would think that a result quite different from 
that mandated in the Court's opinion would obtain. 
Pearce and the decisions following it have made it clear 
that the wrong lies in the increased sentence, not in the 
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judgment of conviction, and that the remedy for a Pearce 
,defect is a remand for sentencing consistent with due 
process. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 247-248 
(1971). In Rice we concluded that the Court of Appeal! 
had erred in ruling that Pearce authorized the expunging 
of Rice's conviction after his de novo retrial in North 
.Carolina: 
"It could not be clearer . . . that Pearce does not 
invalidate the conviction that resulted from Rice's 
second trial . . . . Pearce, in short, requires only 
resentencing; the conviction is not ipso facto set 
aside and a new tri.al required. Even if the higher 
sentence imposed after Rice's trial de novo was 
vulnerable under Pearce, Rice was entitled neither 
to have his sentence .era&ed nor tQ avoid the collateral 
,consequences flowing fr~m · 'th~t conviction and a 
proper sentence." Ibid. 
~ Since Rice had completely served his sentence, rather 
than reaching the merits of Rice's Pearce claim, we re-
manded for a determination whether any collateral con-
sequences flowed from his service of the longer sentence 
imposed after retrial, or whether the case was moot. 
Here, while respondent faced the prospect of a more 
severe sentence at the conclusion of his felony . trial in 
the Superior Court of North Carolina, it was by no means 
. self-evident that this would be the result. ~The maximum 
sentence which he could receive on the misdemeanor 
, count was one and one-half years; but nothi11g in the recor.d 
indicates that the Superior Court judge might not im-
pose a lesser penalty than that, or even grant probation. 
Nor is there any indication in, the habeas record, which 
contains only a fragment of the state court proceedings, 
that the Superior Court · judge might not at the con .. 
elusion of the trial and after a verdict of guilty have 
· before him for sentencing purposes ,information which 
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would support an augmented sentence under Pearce. In 
fact, the habeas court found that the sentence actually 
imposed was more severe than that which could have 
been imposed under the misdemeanor charge. But the 
remedy for that violation should be a direction to the 
state court to resentence in accordance with Pearce, rather 
than an order completely anulling the conviction. Re~ 
spondent was originally convicted of assaulting a fellow 
inmate with a deadly weapon, and later pleaded guilty 
to a charge of assaulting the inmate with a deadly 
weapon with intent to kill him. But in spite of both a \ 
verdict of guilty on one charge and a plea of guilty to 
the other, the Court's decision may well, as a practical 
matter, assure that no penalty whatever will be imposed 
on him. 
Judge_ To. 
rhe Chie~ Justice 
I think this is all balled up . May 
I discuss it with you7 I think the answer 
to this case is so clear ( and so clearly 
not dealt with adequately· here) that I 
wonder if I'm missing something . Jack 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
~Justice Powell 
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Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIS'l', dissenting. 
I would find it more difficult than the Court appar~ 
ently does in Part I in its opinion to conclude that the 
sentence imposed by the North Carolina courts violated 
Fourteenth Amendment due process as defined in North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969 ). I think the 
Court too readily equates the role of the prosecutor, who 
is a natural adversary of the defendant and who we 
observed in Chaffin v. Stynchcornbe, 412 U. S. 17, 27, 
"often request[sJ rnore than [he] can reasouably expect 
to get," with that of the sentencing judgt- in Pearce. I 
also think the Court passes over too lightly the reasoning 
of Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). in which 
we held that Kentucky's two tier appellate system for 
de novo appeals from justice court convjctions did uot 
offend Pearce, even though the judge at retrial might 
impose a more severe sentence than had been imposed by 
the Justice Court the original trial. 
My principal difference with the Court arises over its 
conclusion, in Part II of the opinion, that "the very 
initiation of the proceedings against [respondent] in the 
Superior Court operated to deny him due process of law '' 
The Court states initially that it is not rea.ching respond~ 
ent's double jeopardy contention, but the quoted state-3 
ment surely sounds in the language of doubl.e jeopardy! 
howeve\ it may be dressed in due process garb, 
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The dissenting opinion in Pearce, 39,5 U. S. 711, 726, 
took the position that the imposition of a penalty after 
retrial which exceeded the peualty imposed after the 
first trial violated the guarantee against doub]t;) jeopardy. 
But the opinion of the Court. relying on cases such as 
United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662 ( 1896), a.nd Stroud 
v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), specifically rejected 
such an approach to the case. The Court went on to 
hold "that neither the double jeopardy provision nor 
the equal protection clause imposes an absolute bar to a, 
more severe sentence upon reconviction." 395 U. S., at 
723. The Court concluded by holding that due process 
11 requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for 
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play 
no part in the sentence he receives after a new triaL 
And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconsti-
tutionally dPter a defendant's exercise of the right to 
appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due 
process also requires that a defendant be freed of appre-
hension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of 
thr sentencing judge." 39.5 U. S., at 72fi. To make 
certain that those requiremrnts of due proces were nwt. 
thP Court laid down the rule that "whenever a judg·e 
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after 
a new trial , the reasons for his doing so must affirma-
tively appear" 395 U. S .. at 72o. Thus thr whole 
thrust of Pearce, as written, was not to bar a subsequent 
prosecution of the defendant for the conduct which had 
resulted in his conviction in the first instance, but rather 
to assure that although the second proceeding might take 
place, no more severe sentence should lw imposrd as a 
result of judicial vindictiveness. 
It is therefore puzzling indeed to find the Court 11ow 
speaking in terms that implicate "the very power of tbe 
stat<" to bring the defendant into court to answer the 
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charge brought against him." Slip opinion, p. 9. If 
the Court were correct in stating: the coi1sequences of 
upholding respondent's constitutional claim here, and 
indeed the state lacked "the very power to bring him to 
trial," I would think this case was governed by cases 
culminating in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 
( 1973). In that case the state no doubt lacked "power" 
to bring Henderson to trial without a valid grand jury 
indictment; yet that constitutional disability was held 
by us to be merged in the guilty plea. I do not see why 
a constitutional claim Wthe consequences of which make 
it the identical twin to double jeopardy may not, like 
double jeopardy, be waived by the person for whose 
benefit it is accorded. Kepner v. United States, 195 
U.S. 100, 131 (1904); Harris v. United States, 237 F. 2d 
274, 277 (CAS 1956); K1:stner v. United States, 332 F . 
2d 97S, 9SO (CAS 1964) . 
But if, as I believe, a proper analysis of respondent's 
constitutional claim produces at most a violation of the 
standards laid down in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, 
agree with the Court, thou h not for the reasons it ives, 
fV O at res ondent's claim was not mer ed in his uilt 
plea. Impositwn o sen~er~.~-~~i?lati~1 of Pearce is 
~
/[lot an "antecedent constitutional violation." since sen-
( ~ence is customarily imposed after a plea of guilty, and 
_is a separate legal event from the determination by the 
__ 
1 
,,~,-t~ Court that the defendant is in fact guilty of the offense 
/Lf!' !Ct?-IC.. . •CL.v with which he is charged. 
, Jep t.,~-.Ur . If respondent's claim is properly analyzed in terms of 
e) ~fu..,.- Pearce, I would think that a result quite different from 
u.,.. ~ that mandated in the Court's opinion would obtain. 
~~- t_l:t ~ .A. rf2.t> fA.')(.--2(.·< Pearce and the decisions followin!f it have made it cle~r 
lt----.A ffiatth:e wrong lies in the increased sentence, not in the 
jlt?~ t V~ judgment of conviction, and that the remedy_.for.a.E.e.a.a;e 
Uefect is a remand for sentencing consistent with due 
. -
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process. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 247-248 
( 1971). In Rice we concluded that the Court of Appeals 
had erred in ruling that Pearce authorized the expunging 
of Rice's conviction after his de novo retrial in North 
Carolina : 
"It could not be clearer ... that Pearce does not 
invalidate the conviction that resulted from Rice 's 
second trial . . . . Pearce, in short, requires only 
resentencing; the conviction is not ipso facto set 
aside and a new trial required . Even if the higher 
sentence imposed after Rice 's trial de novo was 
vulnerable under Pearce, Rice was entitled neither 
to have his sentence erased nor to avoid the collateral 
consequences flowing from that conviction and a 
proper sentence." Ibid. 
Since Rice had completely served Ius sentence, rather 
than reaching the merits of Rice 's Pearce claim) We re-
manded for a determination whether any collateral con-
sequences flowed froffi),~ service of the longer sentence 
imposed after retrial, or whether the case was moot. 
Here, while respondent faced the prospect of a more 
severe sentence at the conclusiou of his felony trial in 
the Superior Court of North Carolina, it was by no means 
st>lf-evident that this would be the result. The maximum 
sentence which he could receive on the misdemeanor 
count was one and one-half years, but nothing in the record 
indicates that the Superior Court judge might not im-
pose a lesser penalty than that, or even grant probation. 
Nor is there any indication in the habeas record, which 
contains only a fragment of the state court proceedings, 
that the Superior Court judge might not at the con-
clusion of the trial and after a verdict of guilty have 
before him for sentencing purposes information which 
would support an augmented sentence under Pearce. In 
fact, the habeas court found that the sentence actually 
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imposed was more severe than that which could have 
been imposed under the misdemeanor charge. But the 
remedy for that violation should be a direction to the 
state court to resentence in accordance with Pearce, rather 
than an order completely anulling the conviction. Re-
spondent was originally convicted of assaulting a fellow 
inmate with a deadly weapon, and later pleaded guilty 
to a charge of assaulting the inmate with a deadly 
weapon with intent to kill him. But in spite of both a 
verdict of guilty on one charge and a plea of guilty to 
the other, the Court's decision seems to assure that no 
,penalty whatever will be ill\,posed ou him. 
lfp/SS .5{8/74 -~ 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join Part II of Justice Rehnquist's dissent, but 
this brief statement to emphasize my view that the 
decision in Tollet• v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 
158 (1973) is controlling as to the effect of respondent's 
guilty plea. 
In Henderson, we held that a guilty plea, otherwise 
valid, foreclosed a subsequent attack on the constitutional 
validity of the grand jury that had indicted the defendant. 
The Court today holds that this defendant [respondent] 
despite and otherwise valid guilty plea, may attack 
subsequently the prosecutorial decision to ehhance the 
charge on appeal 2! ~ from a misdemeamor to a felony . 
In my view, these two holdings are analytically irreconcilable . 
If the possible vindictiveness of the prosecutor, burdening 
the right of appeal, goes to the "very power of the state 
to bring a defendant into court", one would have thought 
that the pasible constitutional infirmity of the grand jury, 
resulting in an invalid indictment, also would go to the 
"very power of the state" to try a defendant. 
2. 
If we are to overrule Henderson within a few months 
after deciding it, I would hope that the Court would do so 
expressly and with appropriate articulation of its rationale. 
I would adhere to Henderson for, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
points out, it is important in the interest of the 
administration of justice for guilty pleas, made voluntarily 
and knowingly with advice of counsel, to be respected as 
a definitive resolution of all issues that could have been 
raised prior to the guilty plea. An accused defendant 
has at least as great an interest in the finality of sa 
a guilty plea as does the state, as the entire structure 
of plea bs.rgaining is based upon the assumption of finality. 
May 10, 1974 
No. 72-1660 Blackledge v. Perry 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in Part II of your dissenting opinion. 
Mr. Justice Relmquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
May 10, 1974 
No. 72-1660 Blackledge v. Perry 
Dear Bill: 
I am happy to join Part II of your dissent in the above 
ease. As Tollett seems controlling, it is unnecessary for 
me to address other issues. 
I considered filing a separate dissenting opinion along 
the lines of the enclosed draft, but have decided not to do 
so. Do not hesitate to use any part of this draft, if it 
should appeal to you. 







No. 72-1660 BLACKLEDGE v. PERRY 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL , dissenting. 
I join Part II of Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, but 
add this brief statement to emphasize my view that the 
Court ' s recent decision in Tollett v . Henderson, 411 u.s . 
285 (1973) is controlling as to the effect of respondent ' s 
guilty plea. 
The Court today allows a post-conviction challenge 
to a felony indictment , even though respondent had entered 
an otherwise valid guilty plea to the indictment. The 
basic for this belated challenge is that the indictment 
was handed up after respondent exercised his right under 
state law to a ~ ~ trial following a misdemeanor 
conviction . In Tollett, we held that a voluntary guilty plea 
foreclosed a subsequent attack on the constitutional validity 
of the grand jury that had indicted the defendant . 
In my view, the holdings in Tollett and in the instant 
case are irreconcilable . If the possible burden on the 
right to seek trial de ~ inherent in the challenged 
felony indictment in this case goes to the "very power 
2. 
of the state to bring a defendant into court", supra at _, 
one would have thought that the possible constitutional 
infirmity of the grand jury in Tollett, resulting in an 
invs.lid indictment, also went to the "very p~mer of the 
state" to try a defendant. 
If we are to eviscerate Tollett so soon after deciding 
it, I would hope that the Court would do so expressly and 
with appropriate articulation of its ra.tionale. I would 
adhere to Tollett, for, as MR. JUSTICE REHNOUIST points out, 
the efficacious administration of justice demands that guilty 
pleas, made voluntarily and with the advice of counsel, be 
respected as a definitive resolution of antecedent issues. 
Since the great majority of ctiminal cases are resolved 
by plea bargaining, defendants as a class have at least 
as great an interest in the finality of voluntary guilty 
pleas as do prosecutors. If that finality may be swept 
aside with the ease exhibited by the Court's approach today, 
prosecutors will have a reduced incentive to bargain, to 
the detriment of the many defendants for whom plea bargaining 
offers the only hope for ameliorating the consequences to 
them of a serious criminal charge. 
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CHAMI!IERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
;§u:p-r.enu <!f4t:Url .of tfrt ~~ ~ta:fts 
'Jfultingtan. J. OJ. 2ll~'-~ 
May 14, 1974 
Re: 72-1660 - Blackledge v. Perry 
Dear Potter: 




Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
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